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## The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 04470-85 5 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Distribution						
FROM:	ROM: Charles E. Allen National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism and Narcotics						
SUBJECT:	Proposed Agenda for 24 September 1985 Counterterrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting						
Intelligence Com 24 September 198	Warning and Forecast Meeting of the Interagency mittee on Terrorism will be held on Tuesday, 5 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62. CIA Headquarters. Please dance intentions to and have your verified to us by your security officer by COB 5.	25X1 25X1					
made by a Commun Attendees should discussion. Kee mid-term threats than to review cregarding intell	g topics are on the agenda. A brief presentation will be lity analyst followed by a short disucssion period. I come prepared to fully participate in the followup of in mind that our objective is to address near-to make forecasts, and identify collection gaps, rather current intelligence. Discussion should include comments igence gaps, collection requirements, and make make for improving collection and analysis on a lt.						
	of Increased AVC/M-19 Cooperation. (DIA 1/2hr) the evidence of more active cooperation between the AVC	25X1					
and M-19							
-	·	25X1					
		25X1					

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 Pote	cential for More Leftist Terrorist Violence in Chile. CIA 1/2 hr)	25X1
-	Can we expect an increase/decrease in violence in the wake of the 12th anniversary of the Pinochet regime? What do we know about external support; for example, is Cuba or the Soviet Union the more dominant actor in Chile or is there a division of responsibilities?	
_	What are the prospects for a coordinated campaign against Pinochet by regional forces headquartered in Argentina?	
-		25 <b>X</b> 1
 Pro Sti	cospects for Iranian Retaliation Against Selected Persian Gulf Arabitates in Response to Recent Iraqi Attacks on Khark Island.  CIA 1/2 hr)	25 <b>X</b> 1
••	Is Iran likely to employ terrorism to retaliate against those states it believes support Iraq; what are the likely targets; do we expect to see oil export facilities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia targeted?	
-	What are the implications for Bahrain of an Iranian-sponsored terrorist campaign in the Gulf? How would Saudi Arabia respond to a threat to topple the Bahrainian government?	
•	Does Iran have effective control of its assetsDawa and Radical Shiain the Gulf; are they undertaking terrorist operations on their own?	
-		25X1
 <u>Ter</u>	errorism in South Africa. ( CIA 1/2 hr)	25 <b>X</b> 1
•	What is the likelihood that terrorist groups will take advantage of the currnet state of civil unrest and political problems confronting Pretoria?	
-	What is the position of the ANC on the use of violence against the white population/what agitation tactics are being advocated by the ANC?	<b></b>
•	What are the likely prospects that terrorists will attack South African businesses and Embassies abroad?	

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-	What	foreign	backing	do	these	groups	enjoy?
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 Oth	er bus	iness.					

25X1

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